Tuesday, June 10, 2014
Thank you to DAM from Richard Dowson (Paul's brother)
Thursday, June 5, 2014
Cafés & Shops
Friday, April 18, 2014
Observers Meeting 16th April
Wednesday, April 2, 2014
A video to watch - spare 5mins for this.
Have a look at this YouTube video, think about the message that is being passed on to us as riders.
Then think about how much effort must have gone into standing in front of the camera to deliver the message and why he felt it was necessary to do this.
Made me think.
Mike was a well respected member of South Lancs Advanced Motorcyclists, so we're talking about a very experienced rider.
Sunday, March 2, 2014
Ride outs start soon!
Monday, February 24, 2014
Though provoking, from Visor Down
I'm not sure I fully agree, but interesting thoughts from Visor Down:
THE purpose of training is for the trainee to acquire the knowledge, skills and behaviours to perform a routine or task safely and effectively. So rider training is good, right?
But dig a bit deeper. Operating a motorcycle is not like operating, say, a lathe or a bandsaw. These things present the user with the same situation every time he or she hits the big green button.
Which is why, if they follow the proscribed procedures and training, they’re unlikely to lose their fingers. These are routines; pre-configured, fixed, repeatable patterns. Computers can be programmed to do them.
Even something as apparently complex as flying a jumbo jet, or a fighter aircraft, is actually a complicated but repeatable set of procedures and routines, and of fixed reactions to a relatively limited set of conditions. That’s why computers can fly planes too. It’s rare to find room in a cockpit for improvisation because it’s rare for the plane to move outside an anticipated set of conditions.
As an aside, how often have you been out riding, looked up at a couple of fighter jets zooming overhead and thought, ‘Now, THAT looks like fun’. Well, it probably is –but I’ve spoken to fighter pilots who, when they’re up in the sky, look down at bikers on the road and think exactly the same thing. Because, up there, they’re the ones who are tightly controlled, following a rigid, fixed pattern of instructions. They operate within a strictly defined framework; they ain’t free-styling it when you watch them carving down a mountain valley.
And, incidentally, that’s why bike racers tend to make risky pilots; a racer’s mindset is to take risks and improvise accordingly. Their default setting, especially under stress –ie when something unexpected happens –is not to fly by the book, not to resort to training routines, but to fly by the seat of their pants. Daredevil aeronautics look good in movies, but almost never end well in real life.
Students of the metaphysics of Top Gun will note Tom Cruise’s character –‘Maverick’; see what they did there? –was a fighter pilot who also rode a GPZ900R. But was it his cavalier attitude to blame for the loss of his F-14 and Goose’s death? Even though the board of inquiry cleared him of fault and Meg Ryan never held it against him, deep down Mav knew alright (deep down Mav knew a lot of things, including the truth of his repressed sexuality. But let’s not go there).
Anyway, pilots also tend to make unsafe motorcyclists for the same reason (although the outcome is usually less final); because they won’t improvise. Training has taught them to follow procedures, and that situations can be managed by a learned sequence of actions.
But that’s not how it works on a bike, where the margin between success and failure lies at the heart of a web of such complex physics it’s effectively unknowable: you can write a computer programme or a mathematical formula to describe 99% of what happens to Marc Marquez mid-corner, but that last 1% is fuzzy, quantum-level stuff, known only to gods, monsters and shit-hot motorcyclists. Do you think there will ever be a day when humankind builds a robot that can lap faster than MM93? I could believe it on a plane, or in a car, but on a bike?
Anyway, back to the point.
Motorcycling, in a random road environment, is too infinitely variable to be reduced to a series of routines. There can be no grand formula for staying upright and out of trouble; there can be no manual. Of course if everyone followed the Highway Code to the letter the accident rate would plummet and fatalities would become a rarity. But (a) everyone would have to comply, and (b) shit, how dull would life be?
I believe staying safe on a bike is not about skill. Once we’ve mastered basic machine control (ie we can balance, accelerate and stop with reasonable success) if we crash, it’s not because we lack skill, it’s because there’s a disconnect between what we know, and what we think we know (I put that in italics because it’s really important).
Almost every crash –and there are very, very few that are inevitable –happens because we made the wrong choice. It’s not because we aren’t good enough, skilled enough, or lack the right training. Yes, of course we could all be faster, smoother, more alert,have greater road awareness, read the road, all that stuff. And there’s nothing wrong with being all those things –especially being more alert and reading the scene as it unfolds; although I’d argue that comes from experience, not someone telling you to do it.
So being all those things doesn’t, to my mind, prevent accidents. What prevents accidents is our behaviour and beliefs –how our mind works while we’re riding a bike. It’s stuff like:
• Experience –knowing the best course of action because I’ve been here before
• Temperament –clear-headed decision-making
• Risk management –Size of loss v probability of loss
• Outlook (dispositional optimism v pessimism) –weighing up the chances of success
• Responsibility assumption –a belief that you and you alone are responsible for whatever befalls you.
We all know experience is good. We can guess that riding with a level head and staying calm is safer than riding when angry, or upset. It’s pretty obvious having a healthy dose of self-preservation is a good thing. And clearly, faith in a positive outcome should be balanced with fear of a negative one. If you ever hear a biker saying ‘It’ll never happen to me,’ you might like to sit him down and point out that, based on statistical average, it will, every 8.5million miles.
But that last point –believing that it’s all down to you, that it’s all, and I mean ALL, your fault - that’s a big leap. It can lead to the troubling notion that victims are to blame. Some might say it actually empowers us all. But that’s a different argument.
But for motorcyclists, it means you assume responsibility for everything. If you get in a pickle it’s your fault. If a car pulls out, unseen, why didn’t you see it?Why didn’t you recognise the subtle shift in body language, or even slow down because you saw the junction, the road signs, the turn marks in the road? Did that slippery manhole cover surprise you? Did that patch of gravel catch you out? It’s your problem; it can only be your responsibility.
So here’s my problem with rider training as it stands: it can –not always, not exclusively, but it can –equip you with a belief system that (a) compartmentalises the infinite subtleties of riding reality into a rigid set of predetermined, formulated responses to specific conditions and (b) encourages the transfer of responsibility to a third party (‘How did that happen? I did what I was trained to do so it shouldn’t have happened –and, ultimately, therefore, it’s not my fault’).
Can training make you dangerous?Statistically, I have no idea. Anecdotally, we all recognise the stereotype of the super-qualified motorcyclist who consistently rides above their ability because they have certificates to show they can. They also have a higher-than-average, usually fairly pointless, crash rate.
But my common-sense head tells me to be wary of conferring merit without having earned it. So by all means go on a training course. Learn stuff. Become a better rider. Have fun, even. There are some great riding schools out there.
But my advice is do not think training makes you a safer rider. Do not imagine a certificate confers on you prowess that validates your actions. And do not think that by obeying a set of rules, guidelines and instructions, you will be safe.
Don’t put your life in someone else’s hands. Keep it in your head.
Wednesday, February 19, 2014
Raffle prizes! Come along to the social nights for a chance to win.
Sunday, February 16, 2014
I sold my bike but didn’t cancel my insurance - a worrying problem.
Thursday, February 6, 2014
Risk Homeostasis Theory.
For many years, the approach to reducing motor vehicle injury and death has been the "3-E" approach: engineering, education, and enforcement. Crash incidents have determined or dictated which roadways need improvements, where and what to enforce, and what public information and education should be conducted.
At the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) reports of crashes with resulting injuries, fatalities and/or property damage are analyzed much as departments of transportation all over North America examine crash data. Also included in the analysis is consideration of Average Daily Traffic (ADT)volume. The results of the analysis are used to determine sections of roadways with high crash incidents where engineering "fixes" may reduce the numbers of crashes.
Examples of "fixes" ranged from erecting warning signs (such as deer crossing warning signs at locations of high deer-vehicle collisions), to installing traffic control devices (such as traffic lights with pedestrian crossing signals at locations with vehicle-pedestrian collisions), to redesigning road geometrics (such as changing edge-of-road slopes, redesigning intersections to include turning lanes or accommodations for larger vehicles such as semi-tractor-trailers, or adding additional traffic lanes). This same crash and ADT data might also be used to determine what enforcement and educational actions could impact on the crash problem.
According to Gerald Wilde’s Risk Homeostasis Theory (RHT), engineering or the other two Es fixes may "solve" the initial crash problem at a particular location, but other types of crashes may increase BECAUSE of the engineering, enforcement or education solution. My experience with the MDT projects I was assigned to provide evidence of risk homeostasis.
For example, an intersection on a major highway through a downtown urban area had a history of vehicle-to-vehicle crashes. The existing traffic control devices consisted of stop signs for traffic approaching on the side-street, while drivers on the 4-lane highway were assigned the right-of-way and were not required to stop. People attempting to access the highway often became impatient waiting for access and often attempted to enter the traffic flow when adequate space was not present. This action results in the vehicles with the right-of-way attempting to avoid a collision by swerving into another lane of traffic, or crashing into the people attempting to access this busy highway.
When a pedestrian was killed in attempting to cross the four lanes of the highway, the intersection was considered for the installation of a traffic light with pedestrian crossing lights. Shortly after the traffic lights were installed, this intersection had an increase of rear-end collisions, as those drivers who prepared to stop for the red traffic light were rear-ended by those who didn’t observe the changing of the traffic light from green to yellow to red.
Another section of highway presented a different problem. Interstate 90 near Butte, Montana had a 6-1/2% to 7% grade on the eastside of the continental divide, contributing to numerous semi-tractor-trailer crashes and fatalities at the various curves/switchbacks. Warning signs were installed in an attempt to alert truckers and other drivers of the dangerous curves and steep downgrades. Crashes with injuries and/or fatalities continued to occur. Two curve locations where "runaway" semi-tractor-trailers crashed into the Jersey guardrail in the median contributed the largest number of crashes.
The next engineering attempt to reduce crashes at these sites was to flattened east-bound downgrade curves; this "fix" only shifted the incidents of crashes to new locations. A runaway truck ramp was installed next, which seemed to help the semi-tractor-trailer drivers who suspected overheating brakes, but crashes continued to occur on these steep downgrades.
In both cases cited one kind of risk seems to take the place of another kind of risk and the total risk remained unchanged. It seems when drivers are aware of a dangerous or risky road, they tend to drive with a certain amount of caution and complain to authorities to "fix" the road. Often when roads are redesigned, reducing severity of curves and/or ditches are re-sloped to be more "forgiving", drivers perceive roads to be safer, so they decide to drive faster, thus increasing their risk of severity of crash due to higher rates of speed on the re-designed "safer" road. This kind of behavior has a name, risk homeostasis, and can be explained by Wilde’s RHT
The application of the 3-E approach (engineering, education, enforcement) to reducing the risk of motor vehicle injury and death, according to Wilde, is like attempting to dam one fork of a flowing river. The flow simply spills over into the others parts of the river basin.
If we "fix" all the roads to be as safe as possible (which is financially impossible), drive the safest vehicles possible, legislate and enforce safe driving practices, and educate motorist to follow safe practices motor vehicle crashes resulting in injury and death will continue. If we don't address the source of the water flow or risk taking, RHT predicts that people will continue to take risks leading to about the same crashes. We need to examine WHY people take risks.
In Target Risk, Wilde states "all decisions are risky decisions". Economists ask the question of costs vs. benefits. Traffic Safety Educators should ask a similar question. Let us examine WHY we take the risks we do and explore the potential benefits and the possible costs of risk taking.
Wilde states in Target Risk, "A variety of factors determine the extent of the accident risk that different people are willing to take. When the expected benefits of risky behavior are high and the expected costs are perceived as relatively low, the target level of risk will be high. The term "target" is meant to be synonymous with "preferred, desired, accepted, tolerated, and subjectively optimal". RHT states that the target level of accident risk is determined by four categories of motivating factors:
1) The expected advantages of comparatively risky behaviour alternatives: for instance, gaining time by speeding
2) The expected costs of comparatively risky behaviour alternatives: for instance, automobile repair expenses, insurance surcharges for being at fault in an accident.
3) The expected benefits of comparatively safe behaviour alternatives: for instance, an insurance discount for accident-free driving.
4) The expected costs of comparatively safe behaviour alternatives: for instance, using an uncomfortable seatbelt, being called a wimp by one’s peers.
"The higher the values in categories 1 and 4, the higher the target level of risk. The target level of risk will be lower as the values in categories 2 and 3 rise. Some of the motivating factors in all four categories are economic in nature; others are of a cultural, social or psychological kind.
With experienced drivers the motivating factors are usually so thoroughly internalized that most people, most of the time, are not consciously aware of them. Thus, the target level of risk should not be viewed as something that people arrive at by explicitly calculating probabilities of various possible outcomes and their respective positive or negative values."
"A person’s target level of traffic accident risk is defined as that level of subjective accident risk at which the difference between benefits and costs (including the perceived danger of accident) is believed to maximize. There may be cases in which risk is deliberately pursued, but most risks that people incur are rather more passively accepted as the inevitable consequences of their deliberate choice of action. Anybody who takes to the road knows that they might have an accident, either because of their own behavior, or because of the behavior of other road users that cannot be predicted, let alone controlled."
Risk Homeostasis Theory maintains that "in any activity, people accept a certain level of subjectively estimated risk to their health, safety, and other things they value, in exchange for the benefits they hope to receive from that activity (transportation, work, eating, drinking, drug use, recreation, romance, sports or whatever)."
Does believing in RHT mean throwing your hands in the air and doing nothing to address the costs of risk taking? Does it mean the abandonment of the three Es? Even if you do not believe in RHT can you afford to ignore the possibility that it maybe true? The answer to all these questions is No.
The engineering, enforcement and education communities should explore RHT and adjust their responses to both the cost and benefits of risk taking. As traffic safety educators, we must be aware of the risks and address the decisions that come with the driving task recognizing the reward of risk taking. We must prepare drivers for making the best decisions with regard to risk. We need to remember that "Education that brings no change is as effective as a parachute that opens on the first bounce".
So how can traffic safety educators avoid delivering education that works after the first crash? The answer is to recognize why people change their behavior and to ask: What will it take to get you to lower your target level of risk taking?
In Minnesota a different way of teaching decision making is being explored. This approach starts with these two related questions: What will it take to get you to change? How uncomfortable do you have to feel before you will take action to reduce your discomfort? The theory behind this approach is that people do not change unless they have reached their target level of discomfort. Sound familiar? It should because the approach is a response to RHT and the need to improve education’s response to risk taking.
To directly address sources of discomfort traffic safety education needs to provide learning opportunities that enhance knowledge, awareness of feelings, and the ability to think. Traffic safety education should result in changes that will result in an increased likelihood that it’s graduates will sense the discomfort (unacceptable risk) know how to respond to reduce their discomfort and have their parachutes open when they should.
Excerpts from Target Risk
Reviews and comments on Target Risk and the theory of risk homeostasishttp://www.drivers.com/article/000000162
Wilde, G.J.S. (1994) Target Risk: Dealing with the Danger of Death, Disease and Damage in Everyday Decisions PDE Publications, Toronto, Ontario Canada http://www.drivers.com/store/books/014.php